At the front end, you say:

“There’s a game that Western intellectuals have played since the time of the Presocratics. It’s the game of finding the widest conceptual bucket that holds all other conceptual buckets.”

Later you say:

“Kant was on the right track when he distinguished between noumena and phenomena, the world as it is, without our conceptual and perceptual simplifications, and what we make of the world with those filters.”

Several leading analytic and continental 20th-century philosophers drilled down on the linkage between noumena and phenomena. They found none, and “canceled” the concept of noumena. The continentals made phenomena their subject. The analytics made language their subject, “canceling” metaphysics and defining philosophy as a “conceptual” exercise (where “truth” at its essence looks to me like the “widest conceptual bucket”).

Philosophers who rejected these cancellations took what Husserl called “the natural attitude” as the ground of philosophy (e.g., G.E. Moore). Something feels “off” about contemporary “natural attitude” philosophers “doing” metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, etc, without taking into account the last century or two of philosophy, and falling back on the “natural attitude” to shape their thinking?