It sounds like your position is in the direction of Wittgenstein’s—the idea that the content of some philosophizing is meaningless—and it does seem like some of people you quote are painting themselves into a corner with the ideas they advance—through what might be called “word-games”—or “grammar” as Wittgenstein might call it.
Another analysis might be based on Quine’s idea of different networks or conceptual schemes, where these people are making conceptual or verbal connections between schemes that are ‘cognitively incompatible’ leading to unanswerable why-questions.
The article below, published this month, argues for an empirical analysis of the different bases for such philosophizing, in order to locate ‘ungrammatically’ combined ideas in their diffferent ‘conceptual schemes’ to see how they make sense in their own schemes but not in others:
Thank you very much for taking a look at it.
